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The Opacity of Transparency
ABSTRACT
The normative concept of transparency, along with the open government laws that
purport to create a transparent public system of governance promise the world—a democratic
and accountable state above all, and a peaceful, prosperous, and efficient one as well. But
transparency, in its role as the theoretical justification for a set of legal commands, frustrates all
parties affected by its ambiguities and abstractions. The public’s engagement with transparency
in practice yields denials of reasonable requests for essential government information, as well as
government meetings that occur behind closed doors. Meanwhile, state officials bemoan the
significantly impaired decision-making processes that result from complying with transparency’s
sweeping and powerful legal mandates, and complain about transparency’s enormous
compliance costs.
This article argues that the frustrations with creating an open government originate in the
concept of “transparency” itself, which fails to consider the tensions it conceals. The easy
embrace of transparency as a basis for normative and utilitarian ends evades more difficult
questions: When is transparency most important as an administrative norm? To what extent
should an agency be held to that norm? Open government laws fall short in answering these
questions because, relying on the assumptions of “transparency,” they typically operate at
exceptionally high levels of abstraction. As a result, they establish both broad mandates for
disclosure and broad authority for the exercise of a state privilege of non-disclosure, and they
ultimately fail to produce an effective, mutually acceptable level of administrative openness.
Transparency theory’s flaws result from a simplistic model of linear communication which
assumes that information, once set free from the state that creates it, will produce an informed,
engaged public that will hold officials accountable. To the extent that this model fails to
describe accurately the state, government information, and the public, as well as the
communications process of which they are component parts, it provides a flawed basis for open
government laws.
The article critiques the assumptions embedded in transparency theory and suggests an
alternative approach to open government laws that would allow a more flexible, sensitive means
to evaluate the costs and benefits of information disclosure. It also proposes institutional
alternatives to the current default regime in open government laws, which relies on weak judicial
enforcement of disclosure mandates, and offers substantive suggestions that would improve
efforts to establish a more accountable state and informed public.
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INTRODUCTION
By any commonsense estimation, governmental transparency, defined simply and
broadly as a governing institution’s openness to the gaze of others,1 is clearly among the
pantheon of great political virtues.2 A fundamental attribute of democracy,3 a norm of human
rights,4 a tool to promote political and economic prosperity and to curb corruption,5 and a means
to enable effective relations between nation states,6 transparency appears to provide such a
remarkable array of benefits that no right-thinking politician, administrator, policy wonk, or
academic could be against it.7 But transparency is not merely a political norm; candidates,
partisans, and activists utilize it as a rhetorical rallying cry and weapon to promise full-scale
political and social redemption.8 Contentious political campaigns and popular political
consciousness seethe with allegations that government officials engage in secret, corrupt
1

See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (defining transparent, in its figurative uses, as both “[f]rank, open,
candid, ingenuous,” and “[e]asily seen through, recognized, understood, or detected”).
2
For purposes of this Article, except where noted otherwise I use “transparency” to refer to the openness of
the federal and state Executive Branch to the public. Openness is also an issue in other contexts, such as between
branches of the government (and particularly between Congress and the President), between the judiciary and the
public, and between corporations and their shareholders (as well as the public). While my discussion of
transparency may be applicable in some respects to those other contexts, each raises many distinct theoretical and
legal issues and all are outside this Article’s scope. On the interbranch informational dispute, see, for example,
William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781
(2004). On efforts to impose transparency norms on corporations for the general public good, see MARY GRAHAM,
DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM (2000); Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Sustainable?, John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty
Research Working Papers Series #RWP03-039, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=384922; Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618-24 (1999).
On the value of transparency for the corporation itself and its shareholders, see DON TAPSCOTT & DAVID TICOLL,
THE NAKED CORPORATION 62-93 (2003); but see Get Naked, THE ECONOMIST Oct. 18, 2003, at 66 (noting doubts as
to whether absolute transparency would make a functional, better corporation). On the constitutional basis for
public access to court proceedings, see Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to
Deportation Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 269-89 (2004).
3
See infra Part I.A.1.
4
See TOBY MENDEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL SURVEY, at iii-vii (2003), at
http://www.article19.org/docimages/1707.pdf (last visited, May 15, 2004); Stephen Sedley, Information as a Human
Right, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 239 (Jack Beatson & Yvonne Cripps eds.,
2000).
5
See Robert Martin and Estelle Feldman, Access to Information in Developing Countries, ch. 5 (Working
Paper, Transparency International, 1998), at http://www.transparency.org/working_papers/martinfeldman/index.html (last visited, May 15, 2004);
6
See Alasdair Roberts, A Partial Revolution: The Diplomatic Ethos and Transparency in Intergovernmental
Organizations, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 408 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World
Politics: A Case Study, 54 INT’L ORG 519, 529-31 (2000).
7
On transparency’s emergence in the past decade as a core concept of governance, see Thomas Blanton, The
World’s Right to Know, FOREIGN POLICY, July 2002, at 50.
8
See Geoffrey H. Hartman, A Note on Plain Speech and Transparency, 14 LAW & LIT. 25, 28 (2002)
(sarcastically characterizing transparency as promising an authenticity that will allow the truth to “rise to the surface
like cream, and so to abolish the esoteric in human contact and communication”).
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activities (if not full-scale conspiracies), and overflow with promises that sufficient organization,
popular will, and correct leadership will finally provide citizens with the responsive, trustworthy,
and, above all, knowable government they deserve.
Nevertheless, transparency’s status as a legal obligation for government entities in the
U.S. and as an individual right for American citizens is remarkably vague.9 And notwithstanding
occasional periods of openness, government seems eternally resistant to disclosure.10 Current
political developments—specifically, the Bush administration’s efforts to control the flow of
information from the Executive Branch11 and post-September 11 concerns that government

9

There is no individual right of access to government information in the U.S. Constitution. See Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Manogg v. Stickle, 181 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1999); Martin D. Halstuk, Policy of
Secrecy-Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMM.
L. & POL'Y 51, 74-76 (2002); but cf. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering
the Right To Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 125-45 (2004) (arguing that access
rights fall under liberal democratic conceptions of free speech rights as enabling self-government and checking
government abuses, and thus should receive First Amendment protection). The Supreme Court has found a limited
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings, however. See Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Congress is subject to some constitutional transparency requirements in the
Journal Clause, which mandates that each house keep a “Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy,” and, where one-fifth of those present at a
vote agree, record the results of any vote. U.S. Const., art I, § 5, cl. 3. For a fuller treatment of congressional
transparency, see Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361,
410-22 (2004).
Rather than a federal constitutional mandate, the vast body of federal open government laws are statutory and
provide, with enumerated exceptions, disclosure of federal records and open meetings. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552
(Freedom of Information Act, requiring, with exceptions, that each federal agency shall make information available
to the public upon request); 5 U.S.C. § 552b (Government in the Sunshine Act, requiring , with exceptions, that
every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation). Some states have adopted constitutional provisions
granting a right to access, while all have statutes that perform analogous functions as the federal FOIA and
Government in the Sunshine Acts. See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. I, 3(b)(1) (granting “the right of access to information
concerning the conduct of the people's business”); Fla. Const. Art. I, 24 (granting “the right to inspect or copy any
public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of
the state, or persons acting on their behalf”); Note, Laura Schenck, Freedom of Information Statutes: The Unfulfilled
Legacy, 8 FED. COMM. L.J. 371, 772-73 n.7 (1996) (listing state freedom of information statutes).
10
For accounts of the federal government’s resistance to disclosure, see Thomas Blanton, Beyond the
Balancing Test: National Security and Open Government in the United States, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33, 34-54 (Campbell Public Affairs Institute, Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 2003); Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information
and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2004). The best evidence of generalized
frustration at the state level is the existence of the National Freedom of Information Coalition, an organized network
of member groups around the countries that advocate for stronger open government laws and to force state and local
agency compliance with them. See National Freedom of Information Coalition, Our Mission, available at
http://www.nfoic.org/Mission.html.
11
One recent self-described “polemic” that summarizes the allegations and arguments relating to the Bush
administration’s efforts to control government information is JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE: THE
SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH, at xiv (2004); see also John D. Podesta, Shadow Creep: Government
Secrecy Since 9/11, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 361, 370-72 (2002) (criticizing the Bush Administration’s
approach to government secrecy, both before and after the events of September 11, 2001); Note, Bradley Pack,
FOIA Frustration: Access to Government Records Under the Bush Administration, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2004).

-5-

information disclosure might breach homeland security12—portend a new period of
“retrenchment” (one begun during the latter years of the Clinton Administration) in the oftdelayed march towards transparency’s promise.13 The Bush Administration may occasionally
express its commitment to openness,14 as do most courts when they review challenges to
government agencies’ refusals to disclose information.15 But when executive officers and
12

See Nancy Chang, How Democracy Dies: The War on Our Civil Liberties, in LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT
33, 36-39 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003); Stephen Gidiere & Jason
Forrester, Balancing Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 139 (2002);
Wells, supra note 10, at 1197; Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still A “Sound Legal Basis?”: The Freedom of
Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 4 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605 (2003); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Note, The Freedom of
Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland
Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261 (2003).
Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has withdrawn from public access
information about certain immigration cases and publications that had previously been available from federal
government websites, and has sought to tighten access to information relating to weapons of mass destruction and
“other information that could be misused to harm the security of our nation or threaten public safety.”
Memorandum from Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost10.htm; FEDERAL
RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE
BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/sbu.pdf; Patrice McDermott,
Withhold and Control: Information in the Bush Administration, 12 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 672-74 (2003).
During the first George W. Bush Administration, the number of documents classified has increased considerably
than during the Clinton Administration, while the number of documents that have been declassified has decreased in
a corresponding fashion. See Gregg Sangillo, Incarceration of Information? NAT’L J. Oct. 3, 2004. Congress has
also expanded executive agency powers to withhold information from the public. Critics allege that the Critical
Information Infrastructure Act, passed as part of the Homeland Security Act, will inhibit disclosure of information
about the risks and safety hazards posed by utilities, gas pipeline operations, and similar industrial infrastructure that
had previously been available under state and federal law. See Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 214, 6 U.S.C. §
133; John Gibeaut, The Paperwork War on Terrorism, ABA J., Oct. 2003, 63, 67-68; Brett Stohs, Protecting the
Homeland by Exemption: Why the Critical Information Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 Will Degrade the
Freedom of Information Act, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0018, available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0018.html.
13
See Blanton, supra note 10, at 51-54 (describing secrecy during the current Bush Administration, and
arguing that it began during Clinton’s second term); Jonathan Turley, Paradise Lost: The Clinton Administration
and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 60 MD. L. REV. 205 (2001) (condemning Clinton Administration’s reliance
on sweeping executive privilege claims to keep information about White House activities secret).
14
See, e.g., John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies on the
Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm (declaring that,
“[i]t is only through a well-informed citizenry that the leaders of our nation remain accountable to the governed and
the American people can be assured that neither fraud nor government waste is concealed,” while also advising
agencies that DOJ will defend decisions to deny FOIA requests “unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an
unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records”).
15
See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (noting that “[t]he basic purpose
of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed,” before proceeding to affirm denial of FOIA
request on the ground that the witness statements in an unfair labor practices hearing before the National Labor
Relations Board fell within a FOIA exception because its release would interfere with enforcement proceedings);
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (characterizing FOIA as “broadly conceived”
and intended “to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and . . . to create
a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands,” before
proceeding to hold that an agency’s classification of documents may not be reviewed by court in camera).
AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM
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agencies routinely deny access to the government’s inner workings on the grounds that some
exception or other privilege overrides a statutory disclosure requirement, open government
seems more like a distant, deferred ideal than an actually existing practice.16
This regular departure from a principle that is so universally embraced and so apparently
magical in its presumed effects seems anomalous and exasperating. In fact, all parties to the
uncertain reach of transparency find the legal obligations and enforcement mechanisms of open
government laws to be immensely frustrating. In the federal and state systems, those who
request information under the various freedom of information and “sunshine” statutes regularly
face delays and blanket denials.17 The result of one recent public poll sponsored by open
government advocates found widespread concern that government secrecy is pervasive and that
the public has too little access to public records and meetings.18 At the same time, agencies
engaged in law enforcement, defense, and national security consider open government laws at
best a burden and at worst a threat to their work.19 Moreover, the economic and administrative
costs of complying with these laws is significantly greater than zero, and these costs may
adversely affect the ability of all federal, state, and local agencies to make effective decisions in
a rational, deliberative, and efficient manner.20 One could dismiss these competing concerns as
complaints about the unavoidable costs and inefficiencies of democracy and the inevitable limits
required to maintain a secure nation and functional government. But, to return to the widespread
recognition of its status as a preeminent political norm, if transparency is so magical and
beneficial, why do we settle for less than its perfection? Why must we worry about its costs?

16

With respect to matters of national security and foreign policy, for example, most challenges to agency
denials to disclose documents end at the summary judgment stage, when courts typically defer to agency affidavits
stating the applicability of FOIA exemption (b)(1). See 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
§ 11:11, at 524 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)). And as a political matter, disappointment among
disclosure advocates about the disjunction between the public statements of presidents in favor of openness and their
actual efforts to keep information secret dates back to the earliest years of FOIA. See Elias Clark, Holding
Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 41 YALE L.J. 741, 746 (1975) (describing the
contradictory words and actions of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, the first Executives following FOIA’s
enactment).
17
See REPORTERS’ COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON
TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 60-77 (5th ed., 2004) (describing
the increasing resistance of federal agencies to respond to FOIA requests following September 11, 2001); Michele
Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Records Custodians’ Decision-Making Behaviors in Response to Florida’s Public
Records Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 314-16 (2003) (describing widespread noncompliance by state and local
government agencies to state disclosure laws); The Freedom of Information Center at the Missouri School of
Journalism, Audits and Surveys of State Freedom of Information Laws, available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/openrecseries/index.html (Feb. 20, 2005) (summarizing audits of state and local government
responses to requests made under state freedom of information laws that show variable, but largely imperfect,
compliance).
18
See Andy Alford, It’s the Law: Texans Can’t Be Kept in the Dark, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, March 13,
2005, at A1.
19
See, e.g., Center for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S.
1104 (2004) (describing affidavits filed by the Justice Department and FBI officials noting asserting that disclosure
of information on identities of detainees held following September 11 would harm ongoing law enforcement efforts
and national security).
20
See infra Part I.B.2.
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The problem posed by these questions, and the frustrations with open government laws
that the questions represent, originate in the concept of “transparency” itself. As the core of a
normative and instrumentalist project to achieve open government, the concept fails to consider
the tensions it conceals. It assumes too much of the state, of government information, and of the
public, and as a result fails to produce or helpfully inform an effective, mutually acceptable level
of administrative openness. The easy embrace of transparency as a basis for normative and
instrumental ends evades more difficult questions: When is transparency most important as an
administrative norm? To what extent should an agency be held to that norm? These challenging
but necessary questions typically lead transparency proponents and open government laws to
concede a set of exceptions to disclosure that are just as broad and, ironically, just as opaque as
the transparency norms themselves. Thus, where disclosure requirements threaten to reveal
information regarding national security, national defense, and law enforcement investigations,
the positive norms of transparency must give way to state claims for the need to hoard
information for the public safety and good. These exceptions in turn unravel the ideal of
transparency by vesting broad discretion about whether and how much to disclose in the very
state actors that have claimed the exceptions in the first place.21
The result is a ritualistic struggle over openness and privilege, with grave consequences.
An overly broad conception of transparency with similarly broad exceptions too often leads to
excessive openness requirements placed upon some levels of government and administrative
decisions, and too rarely leads to effective means to require openness when the state makes its
most important, irreversible commitments to a particular policy. Furthermore, a legislative or
constitutional commitment to transparency does not magically lead to the informed, deliberative,
and/or participatory public that advocates claim will arise when the state finally disgorges its
secrets. “Transparency,” used in its strongest and most abstract form in the context of open
government, acts as a term of concealment and opacity that promises more than it can deliver,
and that fails ultimately to further its stated end of a better, more responsive, and truly
democratic government. Rather than abstract normative claims and rhetoric, what is needed is
some realism about transparency’s costs and benefits for the public, for governance, and for the
relationship between the public and government.
Abandoning transparency in its broadest conceptual form does not, however, require
abandoning a commitment to open government and democracy. Rather, recognizing
transparency’s limits forces us to recognize the practical limits of imposing open government
requirements on a bureaucratic state to which we delegate significant authority and of which we
have high expectations. As a general matter, any effort to regulate disclosure must clearly and,
as much as possible, precisely account for both the relative costs and benefits of openness. What
kinds of governmental decisions and political participation are most likely to benefit from
transparency? What kinds of costs and dangers will government officials and institutions face as
a result of meeting transparency requirements? The implications of such an accounting for
transparency rules have not been sufficiently considered; instead, transparency advocates and
skeptics talk past each other within the stale, abstract discourse of transparency theory, in which
each normative and consequential claim faces an equally valid counter-claim.
21

See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 115 (1983).
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This Article seeks to begin asking the questions above by rethinking transparency as a
concept. It begins with a survey of the literature on transparency’s meaning as a component of
political theory, law, and policy. Part I summarizes the arguments in favor of and against strong
forms of transparency imposed on government entities, and describes the conceptions of
transparency’s necessity and limits that are built into democratic theory. I characterize the
ground shared by these arguments as comprising a “transparency theory” that provides an
underlying justification and framework for open government laws. Part II explains transparency
theory and the balance it attempts to strike between the thrust of disclosure requirements and the
parry of governmental privilege claims. Part III critiques that balance by identifying,
explicating, and demystifying the simplistic model of linear communication that itself underlies
contemporary transparency theory. It argues that transparency theory fails to comprehend the
complexities of bureaucracy, communication, and the public, and that, as a result, disclosure
laws exclusively focus on the processes of information production and the types of information
produced. Part IV suggests an alternative approach to open government laws that would allow a
more flexible, sensitive means to evaluate the costs and benefits of information disclosure. It
also proposes institutional alternatives to the current default regime in open government laws,
which relies on weak judicial enforcement of disclosure mandates. Finally, I offer substantive
suggestions that would improve efforts to establish a more accountable state and informed
public.
I. “TRANSPARENCY”
The arguments in favor of transparency seem fairly obvious and commonsensical, at least
in part because an informed citizenry and an open, accessible government are essential elements
of liberal democratic theory and more consistent with modern Western political values than the
alternative of secret government and an ignorant public.22 As a general matter, proponents make
two claims on behalf of transparency: first, a government that is more transparent is therefore
more democratic; and, second, a government that is more transparent will operate in a more
effective and efficient manner, and will thereby better serve its citizens while dealing more fairly
and peaceably with other nations. In this Part, I first summarize these sets of claims, and then
present some of the most trenchant criticisms of them. Critics argue that strong forms of
transparency requirements are neither essential nor beneficial to a democratic republic, which in
its constitutional structure can correct any governmental abuses—either internally through
checks and balances or externally through elections—without the dangers and inefficiencies that
excessive openness creates.
A.

Transparency’s Benefits
1.
Democratic Benefits
Contemporary transparency advocates typically draw connections between their efforts
and the beginnings of modern liberal democratic theory in order to make the argument that open
government is an essential element of a functional liberal democracy. James Madison’s
statement in an 1821 letter that “[a] popular Government without popular information, or the

22

See EDWARD SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 23-24 (1956).
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means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both,”23 serves as the
quote most often used by authors to demonstrate the foundational nature of transparency in
modern democratic theory and in the American constitutional scheme.24 But one can find
similar, if not quite as pithy and compelling, sentiments in the classical liberalism of Locke,25
Mill,26 and Rousseau,27 in both Benthamite utilitarian philosophy28 and Kantian moral
philosophy,29 as well as in the statements of other framers of the American constitution30—even
if the framers’ own deliberations over the constitution were rather less than fully transparent.31
Bentham, for example, argued that publicity enables closer relations between the state and its
public by securing the confidence of the governed in the legislature, by facilitating
communication between the state and the public, and by creating a more informed electorate.32
If fully knowledgeable of the workings of government, the public can play its proper roles as
23

Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, THE COMPLETE MADISON 337, 337 (Saul
Padover, ed., 1953) (“A people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power that
knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue
to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.” ).
24
A recent Westlaw search for the quotation in the “Journals and Law Reviews” database found 201 full
quotations, almost entirely within articles asserting the need for open government. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley,
Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims
of Ownership and Control of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651 (2003) (using quote in opening
sentence to support argument that presidential papers should be seen as inherently public property); Senator Paul
Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve Our Democracy, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551,
551-52 (2000) (using quote in second paragraph of brief article warning of anti-democratic possibilities of media
consolidation). Such use extends backwards to criticisms of secrecy in the Reagan and Nixon eras. See STEVEN L.
KATZ, GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 2 (1987); MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N.
HOFFMAN, TOP SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 106 (1977).
But these uses of Madison’s homily to support transparency may obscure the quotation’s origins.
According to one recent account, Madison intended the oft-cited sentences as part of an effort to support
education—the “popular knowledge” of the quotation serving as an exhortation to a Kentucky professor seeking
support for public school funding—rather than to support disclosure of government information, as has been
supposed throughout the past fifty years. See Michael Doyle, Misquoting Madison, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug.
2002.
25
See AJUME H. WINGO, VEIL POLITICS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATES 16-18 (2003) (discussing the
importance of transparency in Locke’s First Treatise of Government).
26
See JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations of Representative Democracy, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY
AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 262 (H.B. Action ed., 1972) (1861).
27
See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Dedication to the Republic of Geneva, in DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF
INEQUALITY 32-33 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1988).
28
See JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 29-44 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999).
29
See Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949).
30
See Morris D. Forkosch, Freedom of Information in the United States, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 38-46 (1972);
David Mitchell Ivester, Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109, 120-34 (1977).
Nevertheless, the framers neither intended nor considered the First Amendment to prohibit government secrecy or to
create a constitutional right to information access. See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 933 (1992); Wallace Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right
to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1957).
31
See J.R. Poole, Introduction, in THE FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 18 (J.R. Poole ed., 1987);
see also Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 345, 410-12
(2000) (arguing that the closed constitutional convention in the American colonies provided distinct advantages for
the constitutional framing).
32
See BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 29-34.
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enlightened tribunal and collective decisionmakers whose “national intelligence,” trust, and
attention lend “confidence and security” to “open and free policy.”33
Following these principles, contemporary political theorists place the publicity of
government laws and actions at the core of democracy because it enables both the rational choice
of the individual citizen and the full flowering of informed public debate by the collective.
Liberal philosophers who assume a contractual relationship between government and its citizens
presume that openness enables individuals to grant their informed consent to be governed. The
Rawlsian original position, for example, identifies publicity as a necessary condition for the
creation of a just society because it allows individuals to choose, in a rational and knowledgeable
manner, the principles for a society with which they would agree to associate.34 Indeed, formal
notions of the rule of law, whether they emphasize a Rawlsian just state or a Hayekian
minimalist one,35 require self-enacting, publicly accessible, comprehensible legislation that limits
and confines all exercise of public authority, and that facilitates the private ordering of individual
behavior as a result.36 Only to the extent that these laws gain the consent of the governed—
which itself can only be freely given if the laws and their enforcement are public—will the
political and administrative authorities that enact and enforce these laws be legitimate.37
Proponents of deliberative democracy share the contractarians’ commitment to publicity,
asserting that transparent reasoning and decisionmaking by a representative body enable public
discussion and the broadening of citizens’ and officials’ moral and political perspectives.38 A
deliberative understanding of the publicity principle requires that government give public
justifications for its policies,39 and promote rational, critical public debate and unrestricted
communication in order to promote a functional, democratic public sphere.40 In short, liberal
democratic theory requires the state to give an account of itself to its public and to justify its
actions to the individual and community.41

33

See BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 29-34.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16, 454 (1971).
35
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 74-75 (1944); RAWLS, supra note 34, at 238. William
Sage has connected transparency as a concept with libertarian politics, arguing that transparency rhetoric operates as
part of a “resurgent rhetoric of individualism and self-reliance in American politics, reflecting diminished
expectations of government and heightened skepticism regarding public programs and public institutions,” despite
widespread public distrust of the market and of concentrations of corporate power. See William M. Sage,
Regulating Through Information: Disclosure and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707 (1999).
36
See generally Robert G. Vaughn, Introduction, in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION at xv, xv-xvi (ed. Robert G.
Vaughn, 2000) (discussing how approaches to administrative law that privilege the formal rule of law understand the
need for open government).
37
In this sense, the argument for transparency resembles arguments in favor of administrative reform that
invoke a strict conception of the rule of law. See generally Thomas O. Sargentich, The Reform of the American
Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 385, 397-99 (summarizing rule of law ideal
of the administrative process).
38
See AMY GUTTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 100-01; Joshua Cohen,
Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 193-94 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
39
GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 101.
40
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 208-09 (trans. Thomas
Burger, 1989).
41
See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 146-48 (1995).
34
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Legislative and judicial efforts to curb government secrecy and protect informed
individual choice, public debate, and state self-justification harness this liberal democratic
conception of transparency’s benefits. Consider, for example, the normative presumptions upon
which Congress relied in passing the original Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) in 1966.
The House of Representatives’ Report to the original legislation rested its conclusion about the
necessity of a broader, more exacting public access law on the fact that “[a] democratic society
requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the
quantity and quality of its information varies.”42 Congress presumed that requiring government
to make its information available to the public would in turn improve the quality of voter
decisionmaking and, as a result, the quality of governance as representatives respond to a more
“intelligent” electorate. Similar statements regarding the broad democratic basis for open
government laws accompanied passage of the two most important expansions of FOIA, those
passed in response to Watergate in 197443 and the “Electronic FOIA” amendments of 1996.44
Prevailing strains of liberal democratic political theory and open government legislation
thus share the assumptions that the publicity of open government produces an informed and
interested public, and, by implication, that secrecy caused by opaque or closed government
produces suspicious and/ or ignorant masses. Openness is a necessary condition of popular
democratic power, a predicate for effective representative government, and an indispensable part
of the everyday life of the free individual and of the wider demos. Ultimately, transparency
emerges within modern political theory and legislation as constitutive of the public and of the
public sphere itself, creating legitimate government and then legitimating the actions of the
government that it creates by enabling informed individual choice and collective, democratic
decisionmaking.
2.
Positive Consequences
Transparency proponents also cite instrumental reasons for imposing disclosure
requirements on government.45 These consequentialist arguments similarly trace back to the

42

H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1966, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428. The House
and Senate Committee Reports differ in historically important ways because of different sets of political pressures
placed on them during the time of the bill’s drafting and passage. See Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 761, 809-11 (1967); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Access to
Law, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 765, 767 (1968). I ignore these differences because my focus is instead on the larger
conceptual presumptions that the reports share concerning the need and likely effects of transparency.
43
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
44
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. II 1996)). For a description of how these amendments changed agency
obligations to make information available electronic and reduce delays in responding to FOIA requests, see Mark H.
Grunewald, E-FOIA and the “Mother of All Complaints”: Information Delivery and Delay Reduction, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 345 (1998).
45
In this respect, the argument for transparency resembles arguments in favor of reforming administrative
agencies to enable them better to achieve instrumental goals. See generally Sargentich, supra note 37, at 410-15
(describing “public purposes,” or instrumentalist, ideal of administrative process).
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beginnings of modern liberal democratic theory.46 The most significant consequences flow from
the public’s increased ability to monitor government activity and hold officials, particularly
incompetent and corrupt ones, accountable for their actions.47 Additional information also
enables individuals to make better decisions in their private lives and in their engagement in the
market, resulting, for example, in changed consumer and industry behavior in fields as diverse as
health and the environment.48 But transparency also has more subtle, though equally beneficial,
consequences. It enables the free flow of information among public agencies and private
individuals, allowing input, review, and criticism of government action, and thereby increases
the quality of governance.49 When individual agencies hoard information, they inhibit the ability
of entities working in the same or related areas of operation to provide competing or
collaborative work.50 For this reason, the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued, military
and intelligence agencies failed to recognize growing evidence of the failing Soviet state, leading
to massive but unnecessary Cold War military expenditures.51 Similarly and more recently, the
9/11 Commission found that the failure of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share
information and communicate fully with the President led the security apparatus of the federal
government to ignore evidence that may have foiled the terrorist attacks of September 11.52
Military analysts have also argued that the highly structured classification apparatus, which
depends upon formal definitions of classified information, formal procedures for giving
clearance to individuals to view classified information, and technical and operational procedures
for protecting classified information, conflicts with efforts to modernize military operations and
intelligence analysis.53

46

See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 34 (Gateway Editions,
1962) (asserting that publicity is a constituent element of representative democracy by allowing citizens to check the
bad behavior and decisions of their leaders and to encourage the good).
47
See Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 674 F.2d 921, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Skelley Wright,
J.) (explaining that Congress’s intent in enacting the Sunshine Act requiring open agency meetings was to “enhance
citizen confidence in government, encourage higher quality work by government officials, stimulate well-informed
public debate about government programs and polices, and promote cooperation between citizens and government.
In short, it sought to make government more fully accountable to the people.”); MARCH & OLSON, supra note 41, at
162-65; SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT 162-65 (1999); Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty,
the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life, Oxford Amnesty Lecture,
Oxford, U.K. Jan. 27, 1999, at 13-15.
48
See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 653, 662-65 (1993).
49
SECRECY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, 103rd
Cong., Report Pursuant to Public Law, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at xxi (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN
COMMISSION REPORT].
50
See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 73, 77-79, 142-43, 214 (1998).
51
See id. at 154-201, 221-22.
52
See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 357-58 (W.W.
Norton ed., 2004).
53
See Bruce Berkowitz, Secrecy and Security, HOOVER DIGEST 11, available at
http://www.hooverdigest.org/011/berkowitz.html (May 10, 2004); cf. Beth M. Kasper, The End of Secrecy? Military
Competitiveness in the Age of Transparency, Occasional Paper no. 23, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War
College 38-39 (2001) (arguing that the U.S. military must speed its decision-making processes to account for both
the increase in its own information gathering capabilities and the transparency of its operations to others).
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An open government offers numerous additional advantages to a democratic nation,
especially in its relations to the wider global community.54 Transparency enables stronger, more
peaceful international relations by allowing for more accurate verification of nations’ compliance
with international agreements and standards; national markets gain greater access to foreign
investment through credible government oversight and more efficient regulation of market
activity; and global environmental agreements are more effective and more effectively enforced
through accessible information.55 With respect to the increasingly international, cooperative
scientific community, government efforts to prevent cross-border sharing of scientific
information reduces scientists’ autonomy from political and administrative forces and ultimately
impedes their independent advancement of scientific knowledge.56
The empirical, consequentialist claim for transparency views secrecy’s adverse effects on
efficient and effective government as not only separate from but, for some, equal to normative
claims on behalf of liberal democratic values.57 But these two propositions typically run
together, on the assumption that an open democratic regime that enables informed individual
choice not only provides means for citizens to monitor and to some extent participate in
government decisions, but also enables an open society that encourages productive public and
private investment, as well as good relationships with other nations.58 Ultimately, for its
proponents, transparency produces an informed public and a responsive government, and, as a
result, a functional society.
B.

Transparency’s Limits
But governmental transparency cannot be complete. Bentham noted this,59 as do not only
deliberative democrats (who have a particular interest in protecting the deliberation process from

54

Numerous multinational organizations and NGOs have focused on the larger global benefits to open
government. These include the OECD and UNESCO, see Information, Consultation and Public Participation in
Policy-making: Building Open Government in OECD Member Countries, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OPEN GOVERNMENT: FOSTERING DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY 7, 11, 15 (2003),
and Transparency International and the Open Society Institute, see Transparency International, available at
http://www.transparency.org; RIGA DECLARATION: TRANSPARENCY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE
(Local Government & Public Service Reform Initiative, 2000), available at
http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2000/23/RD.PDF
55
See Ann Florini, The End of Secrecy, FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1998.
56
See SHILS, supra note 22, at 160-92; Secrecy and Knowledge Production, Cornell University Peace Studies
Program Occasional Paper #23 (Judith Reppy ed., 1999), available at
http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/publications/occasional_papers/occasional-paper23.pdf; Benjamin S.
DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 606 (1986).
57
Moynihan and Richard Gid Powers, who contributed an extended introduction to Moynihan’s monograph,
largely reject normative concerns about disclosure as a necessary and direct good for democracy, in part because
they have less confidence than many transparency advocates in the inherent possibilities of a participatory, informed
public, and in part because they fear the political paranoia of the margins. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 50, at 219-21;
Richard Gid Powers, Introduction, in id. at 1, 17, 42-48.
58
See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 47, at 26-27 (associating the instrumental and intrinsic benefits of transparent
democracy).
59
See BENTHAM, supra note 28, at 39 (enumerating instances when publicity should be suspended).
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intrusive publicity),60 but transparency advocates themselves.61 Government cannot operate in a
manner that provides complete access to all proceedings and documents. Complete transparency
not only would create prohibitive logistical problems and expenditures (given the number of
documents and meetings that would need to be made available), but, more important, it would
impede many of government’s most important operations and infringe on the privacy interests of
individuals who give personal information to the government.62 Thus, skeptics of a strong form
of transparency complain about the potential excesses of disclosure requirements while they
question both the extent of the benefits that such requirements offer and the notion that absolute
government openness is ideal.63 And if citizens are not necessarily interested in or capable of
being informed by full disclosure of government operations,64 and if the empirical claims about
transparency’s positive consequences remain unproven,65 then mandated disclosure may have
minimal positive consequences and no democratic value at all. Strong arguments in favor of
transparency, in other words, face significant challenge from within democratic theory.
1. Transparency’s Constitutional Threat
Transparency advocates work from the assumptions that a disclosure deficit naturally
results from a constitutional system that lacks explicit commitments to openness, that this deficit
represents a constitutional failing and a threat to democracy, and that some statutory or
constitutional legal intervention is necessary to curb that threat and correct that failing. To
question these assumptions, as then-Professor Antonin Scalia did in an important 1982 article, is
to challenge the notion that an apparent lack of explicit disclosure requirements represents a
threat at all. For Scalia, the tri-partite system of government created by the Constitution provides
sufficient disclosure of government information. The Constitution empowers Congress, within
limits, to check Executive discretion and inquire into the President’s actions, while every
election allows voters to inquire into and reject the political branches’ decisions. Because
institutionalized checks and balances of a constitutional representative democracy lead to a
sufficient degree of government transparency, Scalia argued, the harms caused by any additional
disclosure requirements overshadow whatever benefits these additional requirements might
claim to offer.66
60

See, e.g., GUTTMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 103-26 (evaluating various possible exceptions to the
norm of publicity).
61
See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 47, at 18-25 (discussing legitimate, limited exceptions to transparency).
62
See BOK, supra note 21, at 175-76; Robert L. Saloschin, The Department of Justice and the Explosion of
Freedom of Information Act Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1401 (2000).
63
See Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, March/April 1982, at
14, 15.
64
See DANIEL YANKELOVITCH, THE MAGIC OF DIALOGUE 24 (1999); infra Part III.C.
65
See Neal D. Finkelstein, Introduction: Transparency in Public Policy, in TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC POLICY
1, 1 (Neal D. Finkelstein ed., 2000) (questioning whether consequentialist claims have ever been proven, and
asserting that they are likely unprovable, given the difficulty in testing whether any given policy is “transparent” and
the extent to which such transparency has a causal effect on a subsequent government decision or public behavior).
66
Scalia, supra note 63, at 15. For Scalia, FOIA and similar efforts to force open government are an historic
aberration, products of “the obsession that gave them birth—that the first line of defense against an arbitrary
executive is do-it-yourself oversight by the public and its surrogate, the press.” Id. at 19. This obsession, he argues,
is not merely romantic but empirically incorrect; instead, disclosure of government corruption and overreaching
(including the Watergate break-in and examples of illegal CIA and FBI actions against American citizens) occurred
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The most significant of such harms, at least at the level of creating systemic political
danger, arises from Congress imposing, and the Judiciary enforcing, unconstitutional duties and
demands on the Executive Branch through statutory disclosure requirements. Transparency
skeptics’ concerns about a vulnerable constitution represents the dark side of the theory that a
strong, equipoised constitutional system produces sufficient information; it bubbles under
common law constitutional doctrines that concern efforts by the Executive to avoid information
disclosure. Fears that transparency will threaten the constitution, for example, fuels the core
logic behind the amorphous concept of executive privilege,67 the right of the President (and,
perhaps, presidential advisers68) to resist disclosure of information.69 The Court in United States
v. Nixon,70 reviewing President Nixon’s claims of executive privilege as a defense against the
release of documents and tapes to the Special Prosecutor investigating the Watergate break-in
and its cover-up, identified the constitutional nature of the confidentiality of presidential
communications in the executive branch’s “supremacy . . . within its own assigned area of
constitutional duties.”71 To threaten disclosure of certain types of information, then, imperils not
only the President’s autonomy, it also upsets the careful balance created by the separate
autonomies of American constitutional government. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in the
Pentagon Papers case, provided the strongest judicial statement of this argument. The Court’s
refusal to grant an injunction that would restrain the press from publishing materials whose
disclosure the President claimed would harm military operations, Harlan argued, established new
and troubling judicial authority to review presidential claims of the threats disclosures would
cause, and thereby increased the Judiciary’s power at the expense of the Executive.72
Concerns regarding transparency’s adverse effects to a vulnerable constitutional structure
arise even outside the heady realms of national security and presidential invocations of executive
privilege. Consider, for example, the heretofore unsuccessful constitutional challenges to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”).73 Enacted in the same post-Watergate era as FOIA
because of the internal dynamics of the American constitutional system. This assertion is largely false; although
none of the instances of disclosure he mentions were initially made public through the FOIA, they were the products
of investigative journalism, political activism, and agency error in releasing classified or otherwise secret
information rather than the result of any natural “checks and balances” of internal government structures. See
KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POST-WATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
CIA AND FBI 11-39 (1996). These disclosures resulted from intervention into and disruption of antidemocratic acts
of governmental secrecy that sought to hide information about the progress of the war in Southeast Asia and about
potentially illegal acts taken by those within the Executive Branch or with ties to the President.
67
See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1188 (1999) (“[T]here are as many versions of executive privilege as there are proponents and .
. . each version of executive privilege seems to approximate exactly what the particular [proponent] deems
appropriate and no more.”).
68
See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that executive privilege may extend
to the communications of presidential advisers even when the President takes no part in the communications).
69
See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1069, 1069 (1999).
70
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
71
Id. at 705-06.
72
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 756-57 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
73
Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. II SS 1-15).
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and the Government in the Sunshine Act,74 FACA requires, among other things, that an advisory
committee, task force, or similar group established within the Executive Branch and including at
least one member who is not a federal employee or officer hold open meetings and make its
records available within a framework similar to that established by FOIA.75 Congress intended
FACA in part to enable public scrutiny of what it deemed an increasingly powerful advisory
committee process within the Executive Branch that had been captured by industry interests.76
But in passing FOIA, Congress also mandated substantive requirements and procedures that
regulate the President’s and executive officers’ ability to seek advice from the public. While
majorities of the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have avoided the separation of powers issues
FACA creates in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice77 and Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton78 (by holding that FACA applied to neither the ABA
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary nor President Clinton’s Task Force on National
Health Care Reform respectively), minority opinions in both cases argued that FACA is
unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed upon the President’s freedom “to investigate, to
be informed, to evaluate, and to consult” while performing his constitutional duties.79
2.
Transparency’s Negative Consequences
In addition to these more abstract constitutional concerns, critics also challenge what they
consider to be the enormous unintended consequences of disclosure requirements.80 First and
foremost, they argue, forced disclosure creates a nation that is more susceptible to security
breaches and less able to enforce its owns laws because evil-doers will have greater access to
information that could be used to threaten the health and safety of the public.81 Congress has
responded to such concerns by exempting military, national security, and law enforcement
74

See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good Government, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 458-65 (1997)
75
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3, 9, 10.
76
See Croley & Funk, supra note 74, at 464-65.
77
491 U.S. 440 (1989).
78
997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
79
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 482-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Association of American Physicians,
998 F.2d at 924-25. More recent decisions surrounding Vice President Cheney’s National Energy Policy
Development Group have not reached the constitutional issues surround FACA—at least yet. See Walker v.
Cheney, 230 F.Supp. 2d 51, 75 (2002) (dismissing GAO suit under FACA for lack of standing without reaching
FACA’s constitutionality); Judicial Watch v. National Energy Policy Development Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 5055 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding cause of action in mandamus to enforce FACA, and refusing to reach constitutional issue
until after discovery); appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003); rev’d sub nom.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 124 S.Ct. 2576 (2004) (reversing circuit court’s denial of mandamus petition without
reaching constitutionality of FACA) . On the issue of FACA’s constitutionality, see generally Jay S. Bybee,
Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994)
(arguing against FACA’s constitutionality); Croley & Funk, supra note 74, at 468-71 (summarizing separation of
powers challenges and executive privilege issues to FACA); Carolyn Bingham Kello, Note, Drawing the Curtain on
Open Government? In Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 69 BROOKLYN L.REV. 345 (2003) (arguing
in favor of FACA’s constitutionality).
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See Scalia, supra note 63, at 15 (calling FOIA “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated
Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored”).
81
Two post-September 11 expressions of this position are Anderson, supra note 12, and Laura A. White, The
Need for Governmental Secrecy: Why the U.S. Government Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of
National Security, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1071 (2003).
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operations from disclosure in its exemptions to FOIA,82 and the federal judiciary has largely
adopted this preference when it evaluates challenges to the President’s and executive branch
agencies’ unwillingness to disclose allegedly exempted documents.83
The events of September 11 seem to have reinforced the dynamics of judicial review.
Writing for a two judge majority in the D.C. Circuit’s 2003 decision holding that the names of
persons detained following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the details of their detainment
fell within FOIA’s law enforcement exception,84 Judge Sentelle referred to and followed what he
described as a long tradition of judicial deference to the Justice Department in FOIA cases that
raise national security issues. Because terrorism presents America with an enemy “just as real as
its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore,”
Judge Sentelle wrote, a court cannot second-guess executive judgments about the adverse effects
that any disclosure would have to ongoing law enforcement proceedings related to the war on
terrorism.85 To do so would leave the nation vulnerable to attack.
Such are the potentially grave risks of transparency; disclosure requirements also
undeniably raise the fiscal costs of open government.86 Agency efforts to comply with FOIA are
expensive.87 In addition to the direct costs of responding to FOIA requests, judicial oversight of
agency request denials—made worse by brief deadlines imposed on agencies and expedited, de
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See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (7).
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345
U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (when “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
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supra note 16, at § 11.26 (“[d]eference is great when the agency asserts that a serious harm would result from
disclosure” of documents that allegedly contain national security information).
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See Center for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. DOJ, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
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Id. at 928, 932.
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novo judicial review—drain limited judicial resources.88 State courts and state and local
agencies, subject to or empowered with enforcement of analogous state open government laws,
face similar administrative and adjudicatory costs at the state level but without the resources and
taxing authority enjoyed by the federal government. The breadth of public disclosure
requirements increases these costs. Anyone can request information under FOIA’s expansive
mandate that agencies make all records that are not otherwise excepted available to “any
person,”89 for example, no matter the reason. Frequent FOIA requesters include businesses that
seek the records of competitors for commercial motivations, individuals seeking personal and
family records from the Social Security Administration for genealogical research, or litigants
attempting to circumvent discovery rules in suits against the government.90
Thus transparency appears costly and overbroad; it also harms government
decisionmaking by adversely affecting the ability of government officials to deliberate over
policy matters outside of the public eye, and by curbing or skewing the production of
informational goods. Disclosure of documents prepared by government officials may inhibit a
president and agency decisionmakers from receiving candid, objective, and knowledgeable
advice from subordinates.91 Closed deliberations enable policymakers to make more thoughtful
consideration of the available information and the relative advantages of alternatives, to engage
in more fulsome and substantive debate over the most popular and unpopular alternatives
regarding even the most passionate public issues, and to bargain openly in order to reach a
widely acceptable and optimal result, without the inevitable pressure that accompanies public
scrutiny.92 Anecdotal complaints about open meeting laws suggest that agencies subject to them
hold fewer meetings, engage in a constrained, less informed dialogue when they meet, are
vulnerable to greater domination by those who possess greater communications skills and self-
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confidence no matter the quality of their ideas, and lose the potential for informal, creative
debate that chance or planned meetings outside of the public eye enable.93
In this sense, laws protecting against the disclosure of government information offer a
second-best alternative to protecting against the unauthorized circulation of information in the
absence of property rights protection for public intellectual products.94 Ostensibly, when
transparency is limited, concealment helps to produce higher quality decisions based upon more
valuable information.95 As disclosure requirements become more rigorous, then, the quantity
and quality of information available to and considered by decision-makers shrinks. Thus, public
officers and agencies need some privilege to keep information secret, at least temporarily, in
order to perform their jobs properly. And, more broadly, transparency must be limited in order
to allow a functioning democracy.
II. TRANSPARENCY’S BALANCE
Considered together, the democratic and consequentialist arguments in favor of and
against strong-form transparency share certain assumptions. They each assume an opposition
between the public state and its private citizenry, and that for democracy to function, this
opposition must be managed and, where possible, dissolved. They also agree that in its acts of
93
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governing, the state produces information, whether in the form of written texts (e.g., records) or
practices (e.g., meetings), that exposes and explains its actions; that government would by
default keep at least some significant portion of that information from the public; and that
government can control access to its information. For proponents of strong-form transparency,
these assumptions constitute a problem that disclosure law and policy must solve; for
transparency skeptics (or weak-form transparency advocates), these assumptions constitute a
system of government and a set of norms and practices that any disclosure law or policy must
protect. Put another way, proponents and skeptics disagree about the normative and practical
effects of disclosure requirements—effects that they feel certain would occur—but they agree
both that transparency is better than its opposite in the abstract, and that they can derive and
impose the measure of transparency that democracy requires. Together, they constitute a general
approach that I will call “transparency theory,” which itself includes both stronger and weaker
forms that advocate for requiring variable degrees of disclosure upon government entities.
In the abstract terms of its debate, transparency theory allows legislative, regulatory, and
judicial efforts to impose some level of transparency in constitutional doctrines, statutes, and
regulation that at least appear to reconcile the concerns raised by transparency advocates and
skeptics.96 The reconciliation operates as a balancing test. The constitutional doctrine of
executive privilege, for example, offers a core of protection for the President and his advisers,
but its application requires courts to balance competing concerns, such as “the fair administration
of criminal justice” and the need of defendants facing criminal prosecution for information that
might be eligible for privilege,97 and the public benefits of preserving the former presidents’
archival materials for legitimate historical and government purposes.98 Statutory disclosure
requirements proceed in similar, though somewhat more precise, fashion. In crafting FOIA, for
example, Congress attempted to achieve a similar balance in recognizing that while it attempted
to legislate a “general” or “broad” philosophy of openness, it must nevertheless respect “certain
equally important rights” and “opposing interests” which are difficult but “not . . . impossible” to
balance.99 “Success lies,” the Senate Report to FOIA concluded, “in providing a workable
formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the
fullest responsible disclosure.”100 Congress endorsed the empirical and normative presumptions
of transparency advocates that openness is a prerequisite to a functional model of democracy
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even as it limited disclosure requirements in practice because of similarly broad presumptions of
countervailing interests. It achieved these limits most explicitly in a series of enumerated
exemptions to disclosure requirements,101 versions of which are part of state open records and
meetings acts.102
This dual doctrinal movement—at once surging towards disclosure and then receding
back towards privilege—hearkens directly back to the irresolvable conflict between transparency
advocates and their critics, both of whom offer powerful justifications for rigorous disclosure
requirements and vigorous Executive Branch protections. The balance struck between these dual
movements offers both sufficient stability to provide a sense of continuity in public rights and
government practices and sufficient flexibility to allow somewhat diverse approaches over
successive presidential administrations and historical periods.
Given the trans-historical, abstract nature of transparency theory, in other words, it
should not surprise us that the balance embedded in disclosure laws responds to historical
circumstances, and that one set of arguments or the other will have greater purchase at any
particular moment.103 At such times, the political party or politician whose position appears
relatively out of favor in a current balance will complain that the balance has failed to hold or
represents a poor means to meet the normative and consequential ends it favors.104 Viewed in
this light, complaints that shift between partisans demonstrate both the necessity and success of
the balance struck in information disclosure laws. Consider the typical scenario in which a
former minority party gains control of an apparatus of government and engenders from the new
minority opposition precisely the same complaints that the new majority had previously voiced
about government secrecy when it was out of power.105 When this shift occurs, we could
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conclude that the balance between disclosure and privilege has produced a sufficient quantity of
government information to allow a functioning, competitive democratic system—albeit one that
produces a significant quantity of fulminating rhetoric regarding excess secrecy, corruption, and
conspiracy.
And yet, the balance appears not to be working. The main parties to information
disclosure disputes—the Executive Branch, Congress, and interested members of the public—
remain convinced that this balancing act is a failure. Inter-branch disputes over information the
President is unwilling to release to Congress arise repeatedly; the public remains largely ignorant
about the actions of its government; disclosure laws continue to exact financial, deliberative, and
bureaucratic burdens on government, even when disclosure serves no useful purpose; and vast
quantities of information, some of which may offer significant insight for the public’s
understanding current politics and policy, remain secret. We have achieved rhetorical consensus
regarding transparency’s value, and generated costly and elaborate bureaucratic solutions in an
effort to pursue it. But we have not actually achieved the goals of transparency in practice, and
yet we have generated enormous administrative costs from our efforts.
A central cause of these frustrations, the remainder of this Article asserts, lies in the
conceptual framework underlying the disclosure/ privilege balance struck by transparency
theory—that is, in the terms and framing of the debate between transparency advocates and
skeptics. The balances struck by the Judiciary in the executive privilege doctrine and the
Congress in FOIA presume that suitably narrow disclosure requirements based on the type of
information requested and the context in which it is produced will advance democracy and lead
to positive consequences while protecting government and avoiding negative consequences.
This presumption itself, based on abstractions posed by debates within transparency theory,
relies on a series of component assumptions that, on closer examination, appear both empirically
problematic and conceptually flawed. I turn to these flaws in Part III.
III. OPACITY
Transparency theory, composed of the assumptions shared among transparency advocates
and skeptics about information and its capacity to be communicated to the public, ultimately
leads to laws and policies that misconstrue the issues at stake in the relationship between
disclosure, democracy, and the bureaucratic state. These errors arise from transparency theory’s
positing of a set of discernible and coherent actors and entities involved in the production and
reception of information: first, a producer and sender of messages, the state, that can be forced
to divulge information that it would otherwise seek to hoard; second, messages, whether in the
form of documents or meetings, whose existence and meaning are self-evident; and third,
receivers, in the form of an audience or public, who are able and motivated to understand
disclosed messages and their significance. Put schematically, the assumptions look like this:
1. government constitutes a potential “sender” of its information, so long as we impose
the proper disclosure requirements upon it;
Aug. 8, 1994, at 29; Philip Weiss, Clinton Crazy, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 23, 1997, at 36. On allegations of
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2. government information constitutes a message necessary for a functional democracy,
so long as it is disclosed;
3. and the public awaits disclosure of government information, and will act in
predictable, informed ways, so long as it has access to government information.
At its core, then, transparency theory takes the form of a classic, linear model of
communication that posits a simple process of information transmission from a source to an
intended audience via the medium of a message.106 The most famous such model sought to
enable the evaluation of a communications technology’s ability to transmit information
efficiently and effectively,107 and was subsequently utilized within the emerging field of mass
communications research as a means to conceptualize the processes and effects of the mass
media.108 Transparency theory asserts that government information works in the same manner,
by assuming the existence of a nascent (and beneficial) communications process that is blocked
by the state. Communication can occur, and therefore stronger democracy can emerge, once the
state is pried open and its information set free. Like the information and mass communications
theory upon which it appears to build, this model fails because of its simplistic, inaccurate
conception of how communication actually works.109 As a result, the model obfuscates or
ignores the complexity of its component parts: modern government’s sprawling, often
incoherent bureaucracy, the slippery nature of “information,” the elusive and frustrating
capacities of the public, and, ultimately, the difficulties of the communications process itself.
In the first three sections that follow, I explain the weaknesses of transparency theory by
focusing on its assumptions of a “sender,” “message,” and “receiver” of government
information. I close by explaining how this model serves as a flawed model for open
government laws.
A.

The Sender: The State and Information
The traditional account of transparency presumes the existence of a coherent, responsible,
and responsive state in the traditional form that exists as a model of democratic government in
liberal political theory. This represents two errors that I describe in this section: the
contemporary state is not particularly coherent, and the dynamics of modern bureaucracy are
such that the state is not responsive.
1.
The Incoherent State
Although the nation state retains its power both as an existing apparatus of sovereign
control over geographically identifiable jurisdictions, the “technologies” of power are themselves
dispersed to multiple, overlapping entities, many of which have no direct relationship with
government as traditionally understood.110 The concept of a unified, coherent, sovereign state,
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whether in its general form as an ideal or in its particular form in the United States, is
increasingly under threat from above, in the form of greater economic, military, political, and
legal interdependence among nations.111 America’s federalist system and tri-partite federal
system of powers also create multiple, overlapping layers of governmental jurisdiction and
competencies that at times cooperate with each other and at other times conflict. Thus the nation
state and its subsidiary units have neither the status nor the power and coherence that classical
political theory presumes,112 given the state’s remarkable, often paralyzing complexity, the
political limits placed on its activities, and the near-universal critique of “government”—whether
in the form of calls for its “reinvention” or for its abandonment.113 This is merely a descriptive
claim; whether the movement it describes signals the possible emergence of a better, multi-level
“cosmopolitan democracy,”114 a complex “global system of regulated regimes composed of
locales and regions in a federated system,”115 or a more frightening transnational “Empire”116 is
irrelevant for my purposes. More important is its multi-layered, overlapping structures that
appear incoherent and often conflict with each other.
Sovereign states and identifiable state actors do continue to exist, of course, and
American governmental entities are subject to openness requirements imposed by constitutions
and laws of administrative procedure at the state and federal levels. But at the same time,
complicated governmental structures make the prospect of identifying the actor that contributed
to or finalized a particular governmental decision, or that holds particular government
information, an increasingly complicated endeavor.117 Consider, for example, the sprawling
Department of Homeland Security, which, as one commentator has noted, represents an
“agglomeration of agencies, each with its own set of rules and procedures and unique culture,
[and] raises a host of administrative, regulatory and governmental organization issues that likely
will take years to resolve.”118 When one seeks information about operations relating to
“homeland security,” then, whom does one contact? Contemporary military actions such as the
“War on Terror” similarly require a vast number of agencies with confusingly overlapping
responsibilities. Thus, when the ACLU sought documents relating to alleged abuse of prisoners
111
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held overseas by the United States, it filed FOIA requests with, among other agencies, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and many
of its components, the CIA, and the Department of State.119
The proliferation of public entities is not the only cause of complexity and confusion.
Widespread efforts at the federal and state level to contract with private entities to provide
services, either on behalf or in place of government, further complicate traditional conceptions of
the state.120 Consider, for example, the effects from the increasing privatization of activities
previously performed entirely or largely by federal and state agencies.121 Whatever the merits of
the military’s increased reliance on private contractors in its peacekeeping missions and in the
war and occupation of Iraq, such reliance makes an area of government operations that was
already significantly less than transparent even more opaque and less accountable to the
public.122 Some state governments retain only limited oversight over the privately owned and
operated state prisons with which they have contracted to hold their prisoners, while they shield
the prison operators from the disclosure requirements imposed on similar state-run facilities.123
Congress and courts have formulated complicated, indeterminate rules to resolve this
fundamental conflict between laws intended to cover government agencies and the increasing
reliance by those agencies on private firms for research and for the operation of traditional
government functions. Congressional efforts to resolve this conflict under FOIA have proven
largely unsuccessful. Sorting whether an entity is an “agency” for purposes of FOIA is one
confusing issue.124 Another is the definition of an “agency record,” which the Supreme Court
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has defined as a document that is within the possession and control of the government.125 These
issues are especially important in the regulatory process, where federal agencies rely heavily on
contractors or grantees to perform much of the essential empirical, scientific research on which
regulations are based. Efforts to clarify the legal status of records produced as a result of the
agency-grantee and –contractor relationship have failed in part due to conflicts between
Congress and the Executive Branch, and in part because of the difficulty of imposing
transparency on the scientific process.126 The practice of contracting with private firms even
creates some sharp ironies, as federal agencies have begun to contract out their own responses to
FOIA requests127—leading inevitably to the issue of whether records produced by the private
firms engaged in reviewing FOIA requests would themselves be subject to FOIA. State courts
and legislatures face the same issues, and have similarly failed to develop a consensus or clarity
for their open government laws.128 For transparency advocates, the simple solution to the
problem of whether public disclosure requirements apply to private firms is to characterize such
firms as the relevant state actor with whom they have contracted, and to extend all open
government obligations to all such private operations.129 And, of course, efforts to extend the
burden of open government law compliance to private entities inevitably reduce the economic
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and administrative advantages that originally led government agencies to privatize or contract
out previously public services.130
2.
The Unresponsive State
To further complicate the state’s role as sender in a linear communication process, recall
that the transparency requirement is imposed—in the first instance legislatively, and then
administratively through information requests or bureaucratic process, and finally, perhaps,
through judicial command—upon the state apparatus, which may choose not to comply. As Max
Weber explained, the logic of bureaucratic administration rests in part on the production and
hoarding of information, and on a bureaucracy’s “keeping secret its knowledge and intentions”
from competing organizations and from the public.131 Inevitably, state institutions know what
information they have produced and where such information is stored, and, through that
monopoly of knowledge about their own information, retain significant discretion over the
existence and ultimate release of documents. Their knowledge extends not only over the content
of such documents, but also over whether such documents reasonably fall within any statutory
exemptions from disclosure—a judgment that state institutions make in the first instance.132
Congress sought to address this asymmetry by allowing courts to examine documents in camera
in order to determine the applicability of statutory exemptions.133 Federal courts have also
attempted to mitigate the inequities further under FOIA by requiring an agency that seeks to
avoid disclosure in some instances to produce an index that lists the documents the agency is
refusing to release and the specific statutory exemptions that provide the authority for its
refusal.134 But in the national security context, agencies have succeeded in gaining from
Congress, the President, and courts the authority to refuse even to acknowledge the existence of
information a requester seeks on the grounds that to do so would reveal intelligence methods and
sources.135
In short, the sprawling, multi-headed state must, to an extent, police itself. As Weber
argued, bureaucratization is an optimal process for carrying out specialized “administrative
functions according to purely objective considerations.”136 Given its role as the producer and,
under disclosure requirements, the initial sender of information, the bureaucratic state inevitably
retains significant authority over the production and storage of government information. In
130
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bureaucratic organizations, information enables its holder to perform his or her functions—often
more effectively by virtue of keeping that information from others—and to amass power.137
Bureaucracy’s relationship to democracy and popular rule in the modern state is thus
contradictory: a democracy may simultaneously desire a functional bureaucracy despite the
bureaucratic production of secrets, while it also attempts to impede the bureaucracy’s growth in
part out of fear that these secrets disrupt popular rule.138 Efforts to stop bureaucratic secrecy or
impose disclosure requirements to mitigate it, in short, run counter to the necessary and
inevitable dynamics of the bureaucratic state. In its multiple forms, the state may indeed produce
messages, but characterizing the state as an actual, willing, or even acquiescent “sender” of its
information under current government disclosure laws misunderstands the operations of the
modern state apparatus. In the words of sociologist David Beetham, “[o]penness is the keystone
of democratic politics, but proposals to achieve it are likely to prove insufficient when they take
no account of the pressures causing secretiveness in the first place.”139
B.

The Message: Government Information
The traditional account of transparency presumes that the message or text of government
information is discernible and can be transmitted in the form it was produced by the sender. This
represents two errors: it assumes the existence of a message outside of the context of
government disclosure laws themselves, and it assumes the possibility of that message’s
transmission without distortion or effect. Instead, any “message” that government information
comprises is produced and only exists within a political and regulatory framework that shapes its
creation, and only circulates within a mediated environment that reshapes it in the process of
making it available.
1.
Government Information Does Not Exist
Just as the extent of intellectual property protection structures the kinds of research and
creativity that individuals and institutions undertake,140 so the rules of open government that
exempt certain types of information from disclosure lead officials and agencies to behave in
particular ways when they prefer to keep their conduct or the information they produce secret.141
Scholars have long known that governmental bodies will shift decision-making processes in
response to open government requirements.142 Producers or custodians of information shift the
medium, classification, or content of information they prefer to keep secret towards the safe
harbors provided under the exceptions to disclosure laws. Thus, for example, members of a
137
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legislative or regulatory body subject to open meetings and public records laws may
communicate with each other or meet by means (such as by person-to-person oral
communications or in less than a quorum) so that the “information” they produce falls outside
the ambit of applicable state transparency requirements.143
Similarly, the tendency of those with original and derivative classification authority to
overclassify documents demonstrates the regular practice of disclosure avoidance.144 Agencies
widely delegate to mid-level managers the authority to classify information within categories that
restrict public access,145 while a 1997 congressional commission estimated that a total of three
million government and industry employees have authority to limit public access to government
documents.146 At the same time, safely classifying a document requires little more than fitting
some of the document’s information within one of the broad and vague categories provided by
the Executive Order establishing the classification system.147 For documents at the margins of
the definition of classification, numerous factors come into play in the decision to classify,
including risk aversion,148 political gain,149 or a desire to cover up government incompetence.150
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According to recent testimony before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives by the
deputy undersecretary of defense for counterintelligence and security, misclassification is the
result of government officials who misunderstand classification requirements, fail to declassify
data that is no longer sensitive, and ignore the needs or interests of the public.151 At bottom,
overclassification represents a bureaucratic tendency—perhaps intentional, perhaps merely by
default—to utilize a legal technology to protect information from disclosure. Tellingly, the
inadvertent release of classified documents is far rarer than the inadvertent classification of
information that does not warrant protection.152
When an agency or an individual government official prefers to protect information from
disclosure, then, the agency or official is more likely to produce it in a form, circulate it by a
method, and/ or maintain or destroy it so that the information will either fall outside disclosure
requirements or avoid detection. Although no legal (or illegal) form or method of resisting
disclosure is foolproof, the very attempt demonstrates the fact that communications technologies
and the media of memorialization are fungible. If the form of government information is
fungible and officials and agencies are likely to resist disclosure, then no essential thing called
“government information” exists that can be perfectly regulated to achieve transparency.
2.
Government Information Has No Meaning.
Transparency theory presumes that the intent of the government as author, as well as the
political and bureaucratic significance of any piece of government information, are manifest in
its text. This presumption ignores the complexity of “signification” or meaning-making, the
processes by which any document or oral communication can be said to communicate to, and
have significance for, an audience.153 Communicative messages are subject to formal and
informal rules of language, as well as to the generic and conventional structures through which,
for example, bureaucracies operate.154 Hermeneutic, structuralist, and poststructuralist theories
overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with
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of textual interpretation have destabilized notions that the “text” exists somewhere apart from the
interpretive moment; rather, the text, in its multiple meanings, emerges from the social,
institutional, historical, intertextual, and discursive context within which the reader engages with
it.155
Administrative agencies communicate through a variety of highly structured events and
types of documents— noticed and open meetings, notices of proposed rulemakings, official
memoranda and informal electronic correspondence, and the like—that themselves operate
within certain statutory rules and historical norms, and which in turn condition the form in which
government information appears. The moments in which a government official or other
individual encodes a written or spoken statement that becomes government information, and the
moments in which that information is disclosed and then decoded by members of the public, are
separate and distinct. There is no necessary correspondence between the official or officials who
create and then write or speak “government information” and the public that may receive it;
therefore, the intermediary in the transaction, the document or meeting that contains
“government information,” is not a static thing with stable meaning.156 Given the complex
process of translating data and information between institutional contexts, and the different
historical and social contexts of the text’s production and its interpretation, “government
information” has no pure, essential form.157
Transparency theory not only fails to consider the problem of the text, it also ignores the
effects of information’s transmission and distribution.158 The technologies and institutions of
mass communications—from print to electronic to broadcast to digital media, from major daily
newspapers to cable and network television news shows to informational and explicitly partisan
websites—through which people access disclosed government information affect the message
contained therein and its interpretation. One need not go to McLuhanesque lengths159 to
recognize that individual media technologies shape the form that messages take and establish
distinct dynamics in the relationships between sender and receiver.160 At the same time, media
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institutions play enormously important roles as gatekeepers of information that select and present
news within organizational, professional, economic, and ideological constraints.161 Consider the
incentive and institutional structures within which the press and its employees operate. Media
companies and their employees seek financial gain, compete with each other, attempt to further
political objectives, and strive to meet professional goals of achievement. These objectives, and
the discipline that attempting to meet them imposes, may in some instances lead news
organizations to serve as a conduit of information that would help create an informed,
deliberative public. But more often, they will incline the media towards creating and finding
political scandal rather than focusing on and explaining political issues and development,162 and
towards producing depoliticized, risk-averse, and entertainment-focused content.163
Contemporary politicians and officials recognize these tendencies and exploit them by
strategically disclose “information” through coordinated public relations campaigns that produce
pre-packaged, tightly controlled “news.”164
In this institutional and technological process, the texts of government information are
edited, explained, de- and recontextualized, and interpreted. Put in the context of its underlying
model of information and communication, transparency theory’s conception of information
ignores “noise,” random disturbances introduced by something other than the communicator that
inhibit the perfect transmission of information,165 and thereby fails to note that human
communication processes which are dependent upon symbolic and technological means are
inherently imperfect.166 Thus, the subset of government texts that are ultimately disclosed do not
appear to the public as raw information that is ready, in its capacity as the carrier of the stuff of
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government and politics, to enable democracy and produce the consequences anticipated by
transparency advocates.167
C.

The Receiver: The Public and Government Information
The traditional account of transparency presumes that the public receives and reacts in a
rational and predictable way to government information disclosed by the state. But as with its
assumptions about the sender and message, traditional conceptions of transparency fail to
account for the complex processes within which the public “receives” government information
and then incorporates (or fails to incorporate) that information within its resulting political
attitudes and behavior. Just as the “text” assumed in transparency theory does not exist in any
pure form, so the “public” as an interested, informed, and rational collective does not exist either.
Transparency theory presumes, in the first instance, the existence of an interested public
that needs and wants to be fully informed. This presumption badly needs proof.168 A vast body
of empirical studies demonstrates citizens’ lack of political knowledge.169 Summarizing the
extent of voter ignorance, one commentator has concluded that voters are ignorant about specific
policy issues and the basic structure of government, lack ideological consistency in issue stances,
and have been found to be consistently ignorant about politics by survey research into the matter
since the late 1930s.170 Public choice theory explains this finding by asserting that voters, to the
extent that they have any interest in politics at all, are more interested in policy outcomes than
policy inputs, have an infinitesimally small impact on political decisionmaking as individuals,
and have few incentives to spend the resources required to acquire information.171 Thus the
public’s ignorance is rational and will not be mitigated in the abstract much, if at all, by efforts to
increase the disclosure of government information, especially given the already existing
“superabundance” of information available from existing sources.172
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Efforts to complicate the assumptions of rational actor models and voter ignorance
through the insights of behavioral and cognitive psychology do not change this conclusion
drastically. These fields have identified the heuristic devices, or rules of thumb, that shape
individuals’ judgment processes and lead to reflexive, often inaccurate perceptions, and that
further cast doubt on the existence of the deliberative, open-ended, and open-minded decisional
processes that transparency advocates assume to be possible.173 Candidates and political parties
may serve as helpful, though still imperfect, heuristic devices that enable voters to choose in
relatively rational and informed ways,174 but such short-cuts do not help voters to understand and
decide on positions regarding complicated matters of national and political importance for which
clear heuristic cues are unavailable.175 Consider, for example, public knowledge and opinion
during the period prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Long after sufficient information existed
to disprove the contention, large segments of the American public believed (and to an extent
continue to believe) in a proved link between Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, and the September 11
terrorism attacks, in part because of the Bush administration’s speculative insistence on such a
connection in the period immediately prior to and following the end of official hostilities in the
war in Iraq.176 In trusting the administration’s account, some members of the public who voted
for President Bush in the 2004 election, by relying on heuristic devices or employing rational
calculation, may have ignored or chosen to disbelieve contrary evidence. But, at minimum, they
voted to re-elect the President despite publicly available information regarding one of the central,
pre-war justifications for invading Iraq.177 Accordingly, merely requiring disclosure of more
information might have little effect in the face of efforts to manipulate such information through
false or misleading statements.178
In addition to assuming the public is attentive, interested, and knowledgeable,
transparency theory further presumes that the public understands and learns from the government
information that is or should be released in predictable ways. But the public’s pre-existing
knowledge and capacity to understand information are limited, and the public in turn understands
173
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information within existing cultural and social frames. At the moment a text ultimately has
meaning for its audience, the receiver has decoded the text in a manner framed by individual
social and cognitive structures of understanding that are in part determined by race, class,
gender, educational background, and the like.179 Critiquing largely quantitative studies and
behavioralist theories of media reception as a passive process in which an audience merely
absorbs the pre-constituted meanings of broadcast messages, the ethnographic study of media
audiences has revealed that “people actively and creatively make their own meanings and create
their own culture.”180 The cultural study of media reception asserts that the act of “reading” a
text—whether a soap opera, a television news show, or a report on the contents of a disclosed
government document (or even, indeed, the document itself as it is reproduced in a newspaper or
on a website)—constitutes a process of negotiation between media representations and the social
experiences and background that structure the reader’s response.181 In the formal and social
processes of reception, the “message” operates not as a mechanical signal that produces
knowledge and certain behaviors, but is instead subject to the interpretive frames of individuals
who are themselves parts of existing interpretive communities.
At the same time that the public knows too little about information that is already
available and responds actively to the information it is provided, a significant portion of the
public also believes in, and imputes extraordinary significance to, the existence of false and even
fantastic secret information. Recent work in anthropology,182 political science,183 history,184 and
cultural studies185 on American populism and conspiracy theory demonstrates the extent to which
Americans (as well as members of other political cultures with populist tendencies) often
perceive politics and other aspects of public life as controlled by secretive groups within or
outside government. Belief that power is concentrated disproportionately in secret public and
private elites indicates a pervasive anxiety about secrecy that feeds off of, but does not
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necessarily react rationally towards, the existence of undisclosed government information.186
When significant segments of the public believe that corruption or conspiracy permeate
government, their desire for transparency becomes obsessive and their ability to rationally sort
and interpret information suffers as a result.187 Consider, for example, a satirical book originally
published in the late-1960s called Report from Iron Mountain.188 Intended to satirize Vietnamera official government reports, the book claimed to reproduce a leaked, semi-official document
which concluded that war is essential in order to maintain a docile public and an expansive
economy. Since the moment of its publication, and repeatedly over the past twenty-five years,
many political activists and conspiracy theorists considered the book to be documentary evidence
of a soulless American government that survived by promoting unnecessary military operations
and the ideological domination of its citizens.189 Some readers’ desire for secret government
information, in other words, transformed a satire that resembled a leaked classified document
into real, insidious evidence of government perfidy.
Transparency theory, which assumes a public capable of correctly interpreting the
meaning and significance of formerly secret government information, ignores the powerful role
that secrecy plays in the cultural imaginary. In his classic sociological treatment of the modern
obsession with secrecy, Georg Simmel noted that the secret “produces an immense enlargement
of life” and offers “the possibility of a second world alongside the manifest world.”190 The
actual content of the secret—the information it contains—might in fact have negligible value, but
to label information “secret” is to hint that it offers rarity and value, and may render the object a
kind of fetish.191 According to Simmel, this can lead the public, which has limited access to the
entity that withholds information, to assume that everything related to a secret is “important and
essential” and requires more attention than the information that is known.192 Thus, secret,
undisclosed government information takes on its own autonomous value, overwhelms the
content it imbues with meaning and significance, and affects any effort to process and interpret
information that ultimately is disclosed.193 Unless government operates in absolute
transparency—a logistical impossibility—a populist public that is skeptical about the operations
of government will always want more information, and will always suspect that essential
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information remains undisclosed. Populist fears of secrecy, especially those that are deep-seated
and lead to an all-encompassing distrust of the political order, cannot be sated through open
government laws.194
D.

Conclusion: Transparency’s Frustrations
By their nature, linear communications models simplify complex, historically situated
processes.195 Sharing the assumptions of such models, transparency theory’s abstract normative
commitments and consequentialist assumptions fail to consider and incorporate the complexity
of bureaucratic practices, the communication process, and the interest and responsiveness of the
public. And building upon transparency theory’s normative, and consequentialist assumptions
and its poor understanding of the state, communication, and the public, open government laws
create two core frustrations: they fail to tailor disclosure requirements, and as a result require too
much of government in some instances and too little in others; and they fail to tailor the time and
manner of disclosure, and as a result ignore the specific needs of the public.
With respect to disclosure requirements, open government laws are both over- and underinclusive in their coverage. In some instances, open government laws will defer excessively to
claims of constitutional structure or national security, offering privileges to the state when none
is due or when information is essential to produce an informed and, more importantly,
knowledgeable and engaged public. In other instances, open government laws impose excessive
costs and constraints on government, and in the process impede government operations. Those
government entities and officials that can more easily utilize the inevitable gaps in disclosure
requirements will do so; while those whose work cannot exploit such gaps or do not have the
resources to resist disclosure requirements will be more open. Thus, federal agencies and
officials with broad FOIA exceptions, large discretionary budgets, and litigation support from the
Department of Justice can resist FOIA requests to the greatest extent possible.196 By contrast,
officials at the state and especially the local level, faced with state constitutional and statutory
open government mandates while constrained with limited taxing authority and tighter budgetary
constraints, are less able to avoid disclosure and will therefore be, for better or worse, more
194
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transparent. Ironically, the level of government furthest in distance away from most Americans
is the one best able to avoid openness requirements, while the level of government least able to
afford the costs of transparency is the one most burdened with it.
Because of their over- and under-inclusivity, open government laws cannot always
deliver the core promise of transparency theory: that open governments govern optimally.
Government changes its operations in response to open government laws, sometimes for the
better and sometimes simply to avoid disclosure. Faced with unavoidable openness
requirements, state and local governments may operate in the way transparency theory
anticipates by being more accountable in their actions, or they may decide to govern less,
whether by choice or to avoid the financial and political costs of openness. A document,
controversial law, or meeting foregone is one that need not be disclosed.197 By contrast, federal
agencies that face avoidable openness requirements may operate in the ways transparency theory
anticipates, by disclosing what they must while keeping secret that which is best left undisclosed,
or they may simply govern in a way to maximize their control over government information and
fight all efforts to force disclosure. In their theoretical abstractions and the breadth of its legal
mandates and privileges, transparency theory and open government laws enable both sets of
these variable results, and the frustrations that ensue for government and the public.198
Similarly, open government laws fail to produce the presumed product of transparency,
an informed, participatory democracy, because they explicitly ignore the public, the presumed
user and beneficiary of open government, and as a result fail to tailor the time and manner of
disclosure. Open government laws focus solely on maximizing release of “government
information,” a technical concept that, even if the laws prove successful in forcing disclosure,
still leaves unmet the normative and utilitarian goals of better, more democratic government.
They do not focus on improving the “knowledge” of an understanding, participatory, competent
public.199 Nor do they consider the variable needs or interests a public might have for
knowledge at particular moments—for example, immediately prior to an election or to a
particularly important political policy decision facing legislators or governmental
decisionmakers. Furthermore, because of the kinds and breadth of the exceptions available
under FOIA and constitutional doctrines of privilege, open government laws fail to enforce
disclosure requirements in the areas of federal governmental performance where they are most
needed: to evaluate decisions regarding such key political issues as national security and foreign
197
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relations. In such instances, the public must rely on Congress to provide a watchdog
function200—a task that Congress may find difficult to perform in the face of presidential
resistance,201 or may perform poorly.202 Precisely when the public most needs transparency, it is
unavailable. Relying on a simplistic model of communication, transparency theory spawned the
relatively blunt, frustrating instruments of open government laws.
IV. SOME REALISM ABOUT TRANSPARENCY
Transparency theory and open government law operate at too high a level of abstraction
and form, and take too little account of the anticipated effects of disclosed information on
governance and the public in the present—which should be the preeminent concern of open
government law, given the normative and utilitarian ends that transparency is intended to
achieve. The quality of government operations and public participation in democracy may
improve with increased information disclosure in some contexts, but not in others.203 As a
general phenomenon and in particular cases, secrecy is both contextual, arising from a particular
set of historical circumstances, and intentional, requiring some human agency working to
withhold information from others.204 Accordingly, transparency’s goals require a contextspecific definition of transparency, viewed in terms of specific policy objectives, system
constraints, and the costs and benefits of open government requirements, rather than an approach
that regulates secrecy based on the presumed motivations of officials in the abstract.205 Contextspecific determinations may at times lead to less openness than present law requires, and may at
other times lead to more transparency than current law and practice allow. But they will more
200
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precisely meet the goals transparency theory identifies as the democratic and utilitarian bases for
open government law. To calibrate an optimal practice of open government, then, transparency
theory must abandon equating the best government with the one that is most open—or, more
precisely, with the one that appears most open based on its commitment to formal transparency
requirements. This final Part considers what such a determination would look like conceptually,
substantively, and procedurally.
A.

The Costs and Benefits of Transparency
As part of an initial inquiry, a legal regime intended to maximize transparency while it
enables effective governance must realistically evaluate the benefits and costs of disclosure with
as much precision as possible.206 At present, courts reviewing challenges under FOIA to
government refusals to disclose documents generally do not make particularized considerations
that weigh the respective value of disclosure and privilege.207 Benefits and costs look roughly
like this:
1.
Benefits
For the public and government agencies and officials alike, the benefits of any particular
disclosure include the normative and consequential gains to government described above,208 as
well as the savings enjoyed by government and private industry from the billions of dollars it
costs to keep and protect secrets.209 Although such benefits are shared and spread across the
entirety of the population and government as public goods, specific groups, whether by affinity
or self-interest, experience transparency benefits in a more concentrated way. Some groups, for
example, represent both themselves and the general public in advocating for open government:
the press, which has both a professional and commercial interest in information disclosure;
NGOs focused on “freedom of information” issues; political opponents of the government that
hope to expose information detrimental to the party and individuals in power; and current elected
and appointed officials who want to publicize those policies that benefit their constituencies in
particular and the public generally.
2.
Costs
Disclosure requirements create costs to government operations in a number of ways: by
forcing disclosures that actually harm national security, military actions, and law enforcement;
206
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by inhibiting deliberative decisionmaking; and by imposing administrative costs incurred from
opening meetings and disclosing documents. As with benefits, these costs are largely spread
throughout the population, but some individuals face more concentrated costs. But elected and
appointed officials, for example, experience personalized and specific reputational costs (and
perhaps legal liability) from the disclosure of failed or unpopular policies and decisions.
Additionally, private entities whose legal or illegal input into the public decisionmaking process
would more likely be exposed and who would suffer reputational harms and increased risk of
legal liability also face concentrated costs from disclosure. These latter two disclosure “costs,”
of course, may also be benefits to governance and to the public. An open government regime
must therefore be able to sort government claims about the excessive costs of any particular
disclosure so that protections intended to minimize the spread costs to government are not used
to minimize the concentrated reputational or political costs to individual officials.
3. Obstacles to Imposing Optimal Disclosure Requirements
Viewed this way, transparency advocates face at least two significant obstacles in their
efforts to impose effective disclosure regimes. First, they must assess the costs and benefits of
any individual disclosure, as well as of various types of disclosure, with some accuracy—a
difficult task, given the abstract nature of transparency’s normative and utilitarian goals. If we
cannot assume a linear, causal relationship between disclosure and public benefits, and if we
demand some threshold of proof that disclosure will directly affect military operations, national
security, or law enforcement investigations before we recognize a governmental privilege not to
disclose, then divining a metric for cost-benefit analysis appears exceptionally difficult.
Moreover, the public may be willing to accept some level of excessive secrecy in the protection
of information (particularly relating to national security) whose disclosure would be more
beneficial than costly, because the consequences of wrongful disclosure would be so grave.210
Second, open government laws must vest institutional authority in an agent that can fairly
and effectively enforce their mandates. Most public records laws rely in the first instance on the
compliance of the government officials or agency that produced the records—that is, the
individuals who bear the concentrated costs that might be incurred by the records’ release.
Public records laws typically rely in the second instance on courts, which tend to defer to
officials’ declarations regarding the necessity of secrecy in some areas of governmental
operations, such as law enforcement, military operations, and especially national security.211 As
Judge Patricia Wald, former chief judge of the D.C. Circuit and author two decades earlier of a
significant article extolling FOIA’s virtues,212 recently noted approvingly, the D.C. Circuit,
which considers a significant proportion of the appeals over refusals to release the most
politically sensitive presidential information, has been “reluctant to allow private citizens access
210
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to presidential information via the use of statutes passed by Congress to regulate the executive
branch generally”—despite strong textual arguments that signal congressional intent
otherwise.213 The Rehnquist Court in particular has been unkind to an expansive vision of
FOIA.214 As a result, federal open government laws, as well as analogous laws in many states,
fail to establish an institutional structure that can effectively evaluate the costs and benefits of
disclosure, particularly when the government information at issue is controversial and risks
harming the officials who play a central role in the disclosure process.
In the two sections that follow, I offer some initial suggestions, based on current but
underutilized programs or proposals, as to how the problems of substantive assessment and
institutional structure could begin to be resolved.
B.

The Decisions of Governance and the Time Value of Information.
Open government laws should focus most closely on maximizing benefits and
minimizing costs to two sets of decisions and actions: those decisions made in the first instance
by government, and those decisions made in the second instance by the public. The government
must be able to protect its decisional process from the interference that excessive scrutiny brings,
while the public must be able to evaluate the government’s decision as soon as possible—and,
where possible and appropriate, before a final decision is made. To do so, the public must have
access to not merely, and perhaps not even, a comprehensive quantity of information explaining
the government’s decision, but, equally important, the most comprehensible presentation of
information, as soon as possible.215 What matters, then, is the use that government and the
public make of information, how best to optimize that use, and when the disclosure of
information will hurt or aid in that use.
Secrecy during the decision-making process can, in some cases, be defensible; once the
process is over, however, the need to protect governmental deliberations diminishes considerably
while the need for the public to have access to the information on which the governmental
deliberations were based is much greater.216 In some instances, disclosure of government
information will unquestionably benefit the public while it creates only the administrative costs
to government of making the information available. Open government laws, and especially
those that require government agencies to make information available electronically on the
Internet, handle these instances easily.217 Instances in which the costs and benefits are mixed, or
in which disclosures that would be beneficial to the public but potentially costly to the operations
of government agencies, are more difficult. In such situations, both government agencies and the
party that resolves disputes and/or enforces the open government law would more effectively
213
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further the aims of transparency theory by balancing the degree to which the public, if given the
information, could make an informed political choice in the short-term, against the likely shortand long-term costs on the particular entity or entities that would disclose the information and on
broader government operations.218 The proximity and gravity of the public’s political decision,
in other words, should be considered alongside the type and value of the information and the
costs of its disclosure to government
Such determinations must also consider the time value of the information requested—
both in terms of the benefits to the public of its rapid disclosure and the benefits to the
government of its temporary non-disclosure. Although the cost of information disclosure may
outweigh its benefits at one moment—especially before the government’s decisional process or a
particular government action is complete—the benefits of disclosure may outweigh the costs at a
later moment. Stringent open meeting laws that require all discussions by a governmental entity
to be open to the public may impose excessive constraints on deliberation that could be avoided
by at least temporarily excluding the public. Conversely, classification regulations may enable
government agencies to keep information secret long after any threat of their disclosure is past—
and so far into the future that its benefits to the public have significantly diminished. For
example, consider the issues at play when secret information would be exceptionally valuable to
the public as it prepares to vote or to express public support or opposition to an important
governmental decision—such as the decision to declare war. In that context, legal requirements
or political pressure that will lead the government to release pertinent information may create
high costs, but may in fact be necessary for a functional democracy. Keeping such information
from the public because it falls within a particular exemption or because it qualifies for secrecy
classification may or may not be detrimental to the public, depending upon the particular context
and time in which the issue arises.
Such flexibility creates significant instability and indeterminacy. Government
information laws already consider time as a factor for disclosure, though typically by using blunt
measurements. For example, “sunshine laws” implicitly assert that time matters by requiring the
simultaneous production and release of information through open meetings, while the Executive
Order establishing classification policy in the Executive Branch establishes various durations
after which declassification should either be automatic or considered.219 But intellectual
property law recognizes the time value of information in various contexts, and provides a variety
of means to protect rights flexibly, based on information’s diminishing value.220 Recognizing
218
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the significance of the time value of information, like recognizing the importance of the use the
public will make of information in their political decisions, would make the institution that
adjudicates and oversees mediation of disclosure disputes better able to consider and implement
transparency’s ends than merely considering abstract mandates and the applicability of broad
exemptions.221
C.

Institutional Oversight of Open Government Laws
If more precise measures of costs and benefits are more likely to achieve transparency’s
ends than focusing on the type or medium of information, then determining a proper institutional
locus of determining costs and benefits is essential. Federal open government law relies on
judicial resolution of challenges to agency determinations about the applicability of disclosure
requirements and exemptions. Non-judicial resolution of government information disputes has
served the often contentious arguments between Congress and the President over presidential and
executive branch information reasonably well.222 This is true even for disputes over intelligence
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patent and copyright statutes also explicitly consider the time value of information in providing temporary limited
monopoly rights over certain types of information, they do so through blanket time periods. See 35 U.S.C. §
532(a)(2) (twenty year term for patents); 17 U.SC. § 304 (establishing various terms of protections for copyrighted
or copyrightable materials).
221
See Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 37 (1988).
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See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing,
48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 116-25 (1996); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowledge: Administrative Responses to
Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1992). Admittedly, neither interbranch conflicts
nor state government information pose identical sets of issues as federal open government laws. The interbranch
relationship differs significantly from the state-public relationship in quite significant ways. On the one hand, some
dynamics within the relations will lead to better negotiations: the President often must negotiate with Congress in
order to create and preserve a trusting, reciprocal, long-term relationship to achieve other goals, while the President
and Congress may share general policy goals in some areas (such as, for example, national security), and may be
equally averse to the political risks involved in high-stakes informational disputes. See Shane, supra, at 221-22.
Nevertheless, persistent political competition between the branches and background legal uncertainty may pull the
parties in opposite directions, leading either to Congressional efforts to force the President to divulge information
Congress doesn’t need, or to Presidential efforts to keep information secret against statutory mandates and for purely
political reasons. See id. at 222-26. But because judicial resolution of interbranch informational disputes strain the
limits of politics and justiciability and often prove frustrating for all three branches, most proposals for reform (or in
favor of the status quo) stress the value of negotiated solutions, whether through formal, generalized agreements
over the procedural and substantive frameworks for dispute resolution, or through a more amorphous commitment to
compromise. See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Executive Privilege and Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 660-68 (2000) (summarizing arguments against judicial resolution of interbranch
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activities, which pose very difficult political and national security issues.223 But interbranch
disputes between relatively equal parties operate in the shadow of constitutional crisis; the
Congress and President seek judicial resolution at great risk, and the Judiciary faces similar
danger in trying to settle such disputes. Lacking such underlying political and legal gravity,
disputes between the public and Executive do not lead as naturally to a non-judicial institutional
solution, despite the fact that such disputes can raise similar constitutional issues if an agency
resists its duties under FOIA. Because transparency theory does not consider thoroughly the
complex institutional dimension of government information production and protection, it is
unsurprising that open government laws fail to design democratic institutions that can organize
and regulate information in order to achieve the goals on which the underlying theory is based.224
For open government laws to be more effective, then, they must create and vest authority
in non-judicial institutions that can develop expertise in overseeing informational disputes
between members of the public and government agencies, and that can perform more
individualized inquiries into the costs and benefits of disclosure.225 Such institutions could take
a number of forms, some of which have been proposed at the federal level or adopted at the state
level. Classification review boards can provide preemptive review of agency overclassification,
whether as a general practice, with respect to certain events or issues, or in response to public
requests.226 Vesting adjudicative authority in a separate administrative agency or a department
within an existing agency, as at least one state has done to strengthen its public records act,227
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period of its existence evaluated the decisions by federal agencies not to release records relating to the assassination.
227
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-205 (establishing a “Freedom of Information Commission,” with the authority,
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may also provide greater institutional support for public requesters.228 Finally, Congress or
individual agencies could establish an ombudsman with authority and expertise in mediating
FOIA disputes,229 as one state has successfully accomplished for disputes arising from its own
public records act.230
CONCLUSION
Transparency and open government are at once impossible and necessary. Impossible,
because in their strongest form they rely upon an inappropriate model of information and
communication to produce an inaccurate understanding of government information, which
results in an often ineffective legal regime. Necessary, because a state that lacks transparency
and open government is undemocratic. The task for those on all sides of the debate surrounding
open government is to consider institutional and substantive approaches that would better
achieve the essential ends that transparency theory seeks.
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